Category: Kippur War

Behind the scenes in the Sit Room

On By Marc NadeauIn Barack Obama, Bay of Pigs, Bill Clinton, Franklin D. Roosevelt, George H. W. Bush, George Stephanopoulos, Grand Central Publishing, Gulf War, Hachette Book Group Canada, History, John F. Kennedy, Kippur War, Leadership, Politics, Vladimir Putin, World AffairsLeave a comment

From Pearl Harbor to the neutralization of Osama bin Laden, every US President is confronted with crises. Any one of them also needs to manage relations with foreign leaders. Hence, a need for an organized mechanism and apparatus to navigate the traffic and make sure that POTUS can take the pulse of the world at a moment’s notice. This is made possible thanks to a vital institution, whose history is brilliantly recounted by former Clinton administration official and ABC host George Stephanopoulos in The Situation Room: The Inside Story of Presidents in Crisis (Grand Central).

Before its establishment, Presidents monitored world events on an ad hoc basis. For any military history enthusiast, the depiction of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s wheelchair being pushed in a former billiard room to consult maps pinned on the walls to monitor developments unfolding during World War II is captivating. Like so many other things, John F. Kennedy would be an innovator by creating the Situation Room in light of the 1961 Bay of Pigs disaster. Every one of his successors would rely on this evolving institution to accompany the United States’ presence on the world scene.

The most important takeaway from the book relates to the notion of the “three Ps”. The Situation Room is: 1) a place where information is gathered, processed, analyzed and decided upon; 2) it regroups people who serve the Presidency in a selfless and non-partisan way and; 3) a process revealing how every commander in chief manages the affairs of the world.

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Conflict: The study of warfare at its best

On By Marc NadeauIn Andrew Roberts, General David Petraeus, HarperCollins, History, Kippur War, Leadership, Michael Herzog, Ukraine, Vladimir Putin, War, Winston ChurchillLeave a comment

I was impatient to dive between the covers of General David Petraeus (retired) and Lord Roberts book, Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine and saying I’m happy I did is a euphemism.

The best way for me to review this enthralling book is to get off the beaten path and summarize the 10 main takeaways that strike me the most.

1. Whatever you think of it, “war is still very much worth studying.” That’s the common thread of the book.

2. Totalitarian régimes have an easier time launching, conducting and bearing the brunt of war. The rise of autocracies throughout the world is therefore a challenge for democracies not accustomed with the pugilistic mindset.

3. Don’t cut military spending. “Money saved in piecemeal defense cuts often costs more in the long run.” The authors mention Great Britain’s decision to axe HMS Endurance before the Falklands War as a case in point. They also refer to Israel’s defense cuts after the Six Days War, with the consequences that followed six years later on the fateful morning of Kippur. Deterrence is cheap compared to war’s tribute in blood and treasure.

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Who was responsible for the Kippur War?

On By Marc NadeauIn Anwar Sadat, David Tal, Egypt, Israel, Kippur War, Middle East, Middle Eastern Studies, Military, SyriaLeave a comment

sharondayankippur
Ariel Sharon (in the middle) and Moshe Dayan (on the right) during the Kippur War.

I have always been interested in the origins, the conduct and the military actors who participated in the 1973 Kippur War, which was launched against Israel by Egypt and Syria.

I was therefore very pleased to find this recent article written by David Tal and published in the pages of Middle Eastern Studies recently.

According to Professor Tal, the responsibility of the Kippur War lies at Egyptian president Anwar Sadat doorstep.

Contrary to the school of thought supporting the assumption that “[…] the 1973 October war could have been avoided if Israel had responded positively to Sadat’s peace offers during 1971-1973”, David Tal goes in detail to demonstrate that Egypt did everything to arrive at a settlement through the battlefield, advancing proposals that were unacceptable to Israel and refusing to move an inch on its demands.

But why was that?

“[…] Sadat was offended by the Egyptian military defeat in 1967”, Egypt’s pride was damaged by this outcome and the only way to repair the situation would be either through “[…] regaining the territories without having to negotiate with Israel, or by going to war.”

Sadat’s war aims were nevertheless very modest. A symbolic gain of territory would permit Egypt to proclaim a victory and wash its humiliation.

Everyone knows that Israel won the war, but less known is the fact that the terms accepted by Sadat within the Camp David Agreement framework were those espoused by Israel before the October war and rejected by the Egyptian president.

This war of choice solely happened for Sadat to claim a symbolic victory allowing him to don the mantle of peacemaker few years later.

For anyone interested in the contemporary history of the Middle East and Israel, David Tal’s work is great food for thought.