I have always been interested in the origins, the conduct and the military actors who participated in the 1973 Kippur War, which was launched against Israel by Egypt and Syria.
I was therefore very pleased to find this recent article written by David Tal and published in the pages of Middle Eastern Studies recently.
According to Professor Tal, the responsibility of the Kippur War lies at Egyptian president Anwar Sadat doorstep.
Contrary to the school of thought supporting the assumption that “[…] the 1973 October war could have been avoided if Israel had responded positively to Sadat’s peace offers during 1971-1973”, David Tal goes in detail to demonstrate that Egypt did everything to arrive at a settlement through the battlefield, advancing proposals that were unacceptable to Israel and refusing to move an inch on its demands.
But why was that?
“[…] Sadat was offended by the Egyptian military defeat in 1967”, Egypt’s pride was damaged by this outcome and the only way to repair the situation would be either through “[…] regaining the territories without having to negotiate with Israel, or by going to war.”
Sadat’s war aims were nevertheless very modest. A symbolic gain of territory would permit Egypt to proclaim a victory and wash its humiliation.
Everyone knows that Israel won the war, but less known is the fact that the terms accepted by Sadat within the Camp David Agreement framework were those espoused by Israel before the October war and rejected by the Egyptian president.
This war of choice solely happened for Sadat to claim a symbolic victory allowing him to don the mantle of peacemaker few years later.
For anyone interested in the contemporary history of the Middle East and Israel, David Tal’s work is great food for thought.