In their seminal book Conflict, which was reviewed here recently, General Petraeus and Lord Roberts posit that, in warfare, “the side that learns and adapts the fastest typically prevails.” An ageless lesson, throughout military history.

As geopolitics evolves, my interest in the Pacific theatre during World War II has increased significantly lately. To prevail against the Empire of the Rising Sun, the US Navy needed to destroy its crucial naval power, which dominated its sphere of influence for five decades. Curtailing Japanese supply lines, notably to deprive its fleet and troops of oil, was instrumental. To that end, American forces would be attacking the islands it occupied. “Capturing these outposts in the middle of the ocean would not only deny them to the Japanese, it would bring the Allied forces closer to Japan itself”, writes renowned military historian James Holland in Victory against Japan 1944-1945, published as part of his insightful contribution to the Ladybird Expert Series (Penguin Random House).

The author also evokes the military ineffectiveness of Chinese Nationalist warlord Chiang Kai-Shek “despite the United States’ two years of ceaseless supplies”, the inestimable contribution of future Marshal Bill Slim and Special Operations Executive (SOE) teams in Burma and the appearance of the B-29 “Superfortress” in the Pacific, “the most expensive single weapons system ever built” up to that point.