Two of the greatest pleasures I have as a blogger is reading the best books and being in touch with their authors. Few things make me happier than when they accept to answer a few questions for an interview.

I have always been a huge fan of Sir Rodric Braithwaite, and I was extremely happy to read and review his recent and captivating book about the history of Russia at a time when this country is at crossroads.

As a former British Ambassador to Moscow between 1988 and 1992 and a former foreign policy advisor to Prime Minister John Major, he combines the experience of a man who was on the ground when the URSS was on the cusp of exploding and the talent of an inspired historian.

I, therefore, felt extremely privileged when Sir Rodric generously agreed to answer my questions. I trust you will find his answers of tremendous interest.

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Sir Rodric, I’m of the school according to which great leaders make history. In that regard, I would be curious to know which Tsar or leader impresses you the most in the history of Russia and why?

The question of whether history is made by great leaders or impersonal forces will never be settled. It is the intellectual underpinning for Tolstoy’s War and Peace. In my view, you need both. Even the greatest leader cannot buck reality: Bismarck is eloquent on that.

The leader of Tsarist Russia I find most attractive is Catherine the Great. She was probably the most intelligent and well-read of all of them, and she genuinely tried to modernize and reform her country. The task was, alas, too complicated for her and, as it turned out, for any of her successors.

The task of turning the Soviet Union into a modern country at peace with its neighbours would have been beyond any one man. If it happens, it will be over many decades and many leaders.

You were Her Majesty’s Ambassador in Moscow at the crucial moment when the Soviet Union passed the torch to Russia. You have met with Mikhail Gorbachev. What are your impressions of his leadership and legacy?

Gorbachev was determined to end the nuclear confrontation with America and, together with President Reagan, he succeeded. He made a real attempt to reform the Soviet Union without bloodshed. He did not succeed, in my view, because the Soviet Union was already too far gone, as many senior soviet leaders and officials had already begun to realize over the previous two decades. No one knew how to dismantle a dysfunctional continent-sized communist economy; the growth of nationalism in the constituent parts of the Soviet Union had been visible for years: it could perhaps have been stemmed, though not reversed, by the massive use of tanks. It’s to Gorbachev’s credit that he was not prepared to try that.

The task of turning the Soviet Union into a modern country at peace with its neighbours would have been beyond any one man. If it happens, it will be over many decades and many leaders.

My wife Jill was on the barricades with Russian friends outside the Moscow White House during the failed coup in 1991, when Yeltsin was besieged by Soviet tanks.

Serving as HM’s Ambassador at that pivotal moment in history must have been a fascinating experience. You are a master storyteller. Would you have any anecdotes to share with us about your time in Moscow or perhaps with Mr. Gorbatchev?

It was exhilarating to live through the revolution that the Soviet Union was undergoing while we were there. My wife Jill was on the barricades with Russian friends outside the Moscow White House during the failed coup in 1991, when Yeltsin was besieged by Soviet tanks. We were having our Christmas dinner when the Soviet flag came down for the last time over the Kremlin and was replaced by the flag of Russia.

I had quite a lot to do with Gorbachev. I liked him. He was a decent man.

Аn anecdote: I called on him a couple of months after his wife Raisa died in 1999. He was looking very glum, so I gave him a hug. Mournfully he said: “I dreamt last night that the phone rang. I picked it up: it was Raisa. I asked where she was ringing from. The phone went dead.” For a minute Gorbachev locked deeply upset. Then, characteristically, he brightened up and said enthusiastically: “Do you know what I did last Sunday? I founded a new social Democrat party!”

Another anecdote: Jill died in 2008. A couple of weeks later the phone rang in my house. Someone was bubbling in Russian. “Who is that?”, I asked. “Don’t you recognize my voice?” said the caller. Gorbachev had personally dialled the phone to express his sorrow at Jill’s death.

Launching a war against Ukraine was a monumental mistake by President Vladimir Putin. Based on what I read in your book, I realize that this war must be understood in a much larger historical context. Would you say that this war is an anomaly or just a sign of continuity in the troubled relationship between Moscow and Kyiv?

In one sense it is a sign of continuity in the difficult and contested relationship between the two countries. But in the deeper sense, I think it marks a decisive new stage. Putin’s war has forged Ukraine’s sense of nationhood on the battlefield. That must surely have scotched any lingering ideas Russians may have that Ukraine would one day return to the bottom of the Russian family.

To almost everyone in the West, Vladimir Putin is portrayed as a hardliner, which would be quite difficult to contradict. In the big realm of Russian history and amid all the factions vying for power and influence in Moscow, where do you position him?

Putin is indeed a hardliner and a narrow-minded Russian nationalist. Many of his ideas about Russia’s place in the world are unoriginal and shared by many of his compatriots. At the same time, there are people active in Russian politics who are more extreme than he is, who have criticized him for being excessively soft on the West ever since he kept apart. He has to guard his back, and he has always been much less brutal in dealing with the threat they pose than he has been in his handling of Russian liberals.

The Putin regime is clearly entering its last stage.

There is lots of talk about the potential removal of President Putin in a potential coup. In your book, you refer to those episodes when the Tsars were overthrown by their entourage, notably the military. Do you think the same could happen today?

The Imperial Guards were involved in Russian politics on a number of occasions. Peter used them to overthrow his half-sister, Sofia, who was then the effective ruler of Russia. Elizabeth and Catherine used them to take power at the expense of the legitimate Tsar. The murder of Paul I, Alexander I’s father, was a messy affair in which a number of senior officials as well as officers of the guards were involved. In 1917 the Preobrazhensky Guards were among the army units who fatally undermined the authority of Nicholas I when they mutinied in February 1917. 

The army was involved in politics on other occasions too. There was the unsuccessful Decembrist rebellion of 1825. To insure against “Bonapartism”, the capture of the revolution by a strong military leader, Stalin shot some of his best generals in the late 1930s and humiliated his most successful commanders after 1945. The army was heavily involved in the manoeuvring after Stalin died that led to the emergence of Khrushchev as Soviet leader in 1953 and to his ouster in 1964. The army’s leaders were among those who conspired against Gorbachev in 1991. But Russia has never had a military dictator, unlike France.

I’m not sure how relevant this is to Putin’s future. Like many leaders who stay in office too long, Putin’s political instincts have coarsened, and he has come to believe he can walk on water. For a decade and a half, he gave the Russian people stability, prosperity, and a renewed sense of their importance in the world, in exchange for exclusive political power and riches for his cronies and himself. That bargain has been severely damaged by the failure of his Ukrainian gamble: whatever the outcome of the war, there is no prospect that the Ukrainians can be brought back into the bosom of the great Russian family. The army and the intelligence services have been humiliated, and ordinary Russians directly affected by mobilisation. So far, the macroeconomy is being effectively managed despite sanctions: but Russians’ freedom to travel and buy foreign goods has been severely curtailed and things are likely to get worse. 

So, the Putin regime is clearly entering its last stage. No doubt some generals, as well as spies, officials, and politicians, will be involved in the manoeuvres to replace him. Ordinary Russians may continue passive; but they are well informed about what has been happening, and they are most unlikely to support him. But I don’t think one can speculate profitably about how exactly he will go, or who will replace him. After all, we’re not much good at predicting the twists of our own politics. Even our own contenders for power have no idea which of them will emerge triumphant. We know even less about what goes on in Moscow.

Russia will not be able to cut itself off from Europe, as some right-wing Russian extremists would like. Present attempts to do so smack of braggadocio and will leave a damaging legacy.

In your expertise as a historian, is there a period in Russian history to which the current situation could be compared?

I’m not sure that one could compare the present to any previous period in Russian history. Whether the Russians like it or not, their country is far more involved in the outside world than it used to be, thanks to existence of modern methods of communication and the Internet, to name but one factor. Russia will not be able to cut itself off from Europe, as some right-wing Russian extremists would like. Present attempts to do so smack of braggadocio and will leave a damaging legacy.

For Zelensky, the task of mopping up the damage and bringing Ukraine up to the standards of a modern state will prove as difficult as running a war.

In your book, you brush insightful portraits of several Russian leaders over the centuries. What are your observations about Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky?

There are no obvious precedents to Zelensky in previous Russian or Ukrainian (or indeed in any other country’s) history. He was catapulted into the Ukrainian presidency from an almost wholly apolitical background. His attempts should get a grip on the dysfunctional Ukrainian political and economic system were not a success. But he has turned out to be a quite remarkably effective leader in wartime. Assuming the war ends on acceptable terms for Ukraine, the task of mopping up the damage and bringing Ukraine up to the standards of a modern state will prove as difficult as running a war.

Do you have another book project on your writing table and, if so, are you at liberty to share the subject with us?

No, I don’t have another book project at the moment. At my age, it would be surprising if I did. But you never can tell!

Many sincere thanks for the generosity of your time, Sir Rodric!

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Sir Rodric Braithwaite’s latest book, Russia: Myths and Realities, has recently been published by Pegasus Books.

I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to Meghan Jusczak, Director of Publicity at Pegasus Books, for arranging this interview. Good publicists are instrumental in the success of a blogger.